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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs agree with the statement of the case as presented
by Petitioner, except to add the following:
At Trial, Plaintiffs and Defendant American Savings and Loan
read

a Stipulation of Facts into the record.
Factual

Stipulation.

The other

Defendant

parties

accepted

that

Liston

then

proceeded

with evidence as it affected his claim of Interest

in

the property.
From
that

the

portion

Petitioner.

decision of the Trial Court,
of

the

Judgment

that

Plaintiff

reinstated

appealed

the

No other parties joined in the Appeal.

Lien

of

The Court of

Appeals reversed and defendants filed a petition for Certiorari.
Plaintiffs

were

granted

an extension until

the

21st

day

of

November, 1987 for filing their brief in opposition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts correctly recites the Stipulation of
the

parties and the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of

Law",

except that Plaintiff does not agree with the characterization of
some facts as strictly Findings of Fact to wit:
The Courts Finding that Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had
more

than

sufficient

information

to

necessitate

inguiry

is set forth as both a Finding of Fact and a

of Law.

(F/F 24, C/L 1).

The

finding

that

such

an
1

inguiry

would

a

further

Conclusion

have,

in

all

probability,
been

lead to the Discovery that the Trust Deed

had

not

paid is both a Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law.

(F/F

25, C/L 2).
The
should

Finding that Wayne Peck and/or Brad Pentelute

have known something was amiss regarding

knew

the Rydalches'

representations of their fee ownership is both a Finding of
and Conclusion of Law.
The

or

Fact

(F/F 26, C/L 3).

release of American Savings and Loans interest

in

the

property, which set the stage for the entire chain of events, was
a negligent and unilateral act of American Savings and Loan. (C/L
30).
ARGUMENT
PETITION

FOR

CERTIORARI

SHOULD NOT

BE

GRANTED

IN

THIS

MATTER.
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY ASSESSED THE STANDARD
REVIEW FOR A CASE PRESENTED ON STIPULATED FACTS..
The

process of Trial requires both a determination of

OF
what

actually occurred, and the interpretation of the meaning of those
acts

as

trial

filtered through the analysis of law.

Thus,

when

the

Judge acts in the dual capacity as both trier of fact

and

Arbiter of the law his ruling is divided into two parts in
to
and

assist the parties and counsel in understanding the
to

assist

Appellate

Courts

process.
2

in

fulfilling

order

Judgment

their

review

At

least

part of the justification

for

this

bifurcation

springs from the review process that provides different standards
of review for "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusion of Law":
Without
template

Facts, there is no surface upon which to apply

of the law.

interprets

the

Facts form pieces of the puzzle, the

the picture they form.

So while the "Truth"

law

of

the

case may vary, the law is constant.
For this reason, the process of review afforded to
of

findings

the Trial Court will hinge on what type of determination

the

Trial Court is making.
"Findings
evidence,
due

of

Fact, whether based on

oral or

shall not be set aside unless clearly

documentary

erroneous, and

regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial

court

to judge the credibility of the witnesses".(emphasis added.)
Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, 52(a); State v. Walker,

64 Utah

Ad. Rep. 10 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1987).

Conclusions of Law on the other

hand are not accorded

but

correctness.

Scharf

deference

are

v. B.M.G. CORP.,

simply
700 P.

reviewed

for

2d 1068

(Utah

1985). The instant case, however, did not come to the Trial Court
on a dispute over what occurred, but rather, on what those

facts

meant.
Petitioner

recites six and one half pages of facts in their

brief, but all reference to the record are either to the Findings
of

the

trial

judges contained in his

Facts

and

Conclusions of Law, and/or the Stipulation of Fact read into

the

3

Findings

of

record

by

the parties which created the basis for

all

Factual

determinations•
This phenomena was not lost on the Court of Appeals.
The
notes

Court

that

interest

the

of

documentary

of Appeals in the opinion in

the

rulings of the trial court as

the parties on appeal was not based
evidence

but rather, upon a

it

case

affects

upon

the

oral

stipulation

which was read into the record by counsel.
v. American Savings, 739

instant

of

Diversified

or

facts

Equities

P.2d. 1133 (1987).

Once such a stipulation has occurred, those facts are deemed
decided

and

the trier of fact need

not

arbitrate

differences

between the parties.
Petitioner
Appellate Court's
point

seems

to

recognize the correctness

analysis in this regard as they are

of

the

quick

to

out that this case involved not just the stipulation,

testimony.

In part, the Assertion is correct, but it

save

As noted by the Trial Court in its

them.

does

but
not

findings, there

was testimony:
"The parties represented at the hearing having
entered into and presented an Oral Stipulation of
Fact, agreed to by all the parties so represented,
and
said
parties
having
introduced
their
respective documents which were admitted into
evidence, and Defendant Mark Engar Liston having
presented
evidence,.
.
."[Emphasis
added.]
Findings, Page 2.
Mr.
petition.

Liston

was

not a party to the appeal

below

The issues he litigated through testimony are

4

or

this

settled

and

nobody has asked this Court or the Appellate Court to review

those

findings.

The dispute of fact that would call

upon

the

Judge to view the witnesses and assess their credibility is all a
part of history.

All issues presented to the Appeal Court spring

from the stipulation of fact.
The

question

not governed
matter

of

of

what

deference to apply during review is

by technicality,

but by substance.

whether anyone at any time in the

It is not

proceedings

a

spoke

from the stand, but what they testified to, and what evidence the
court accepted with regards to the issues under review.
It is

significant that petitioner no where

factual dispute

points

between the parties now before the

to

any

Court, the

only dispute between these parties were the conclusions

that the

Trial Court should draw from the events as stipulated.

The Court

of Appeals correctly analyzed the test:
' "Where the facts are not in material dispute,
interpretation placed thereon by Trial
Court
becomes a question of law which is not Conclusive
on Appeal"' Diversified Equities v. American,
supra at 1136, citing City of Spencer v. Hawkeye
Security Ins. Co. 216 N.W. 2nd 406, 408 (Iowa,
1974).
The Trial Court, as well, recognized that it was not finding
facts, but drawing legal conclusions.
In his memorandum decision, the Trial Court states:
"The Court concludes that any attempt to set forth
the facts and events, leading up to and necessary
for the disposition of the claims of the parties
would be in most part a reiteration of the
Stipulation of Facts, and the parties should
5

therefore
refer
to
such
stipulation
necessary"• Memorandum Decision , Page 2.
The

when

Court then goes on to discuss its conclusions. As

Trial

Court

recognized, there never was a material

fact

between

the

parties, and, the

Court

of

the

dispute

of

Appeals applied

the proper standard for review.
II.
WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
FOR VALUE WAS A LEGAL CONCLUSION IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
Petitioner further supports its argument that the
standard

of

determination

review
the

was

Court

used

by

makes

attempting

with

respect

purchaser status as one strictly of fact.
several

cases

determination
value

and

which
of

to
to

style
good

the
faith

Petitioner then cites

allegedly support the

position

whether a party is a bona fide

whether such purchaser met

wrong

that

the

purchaser

for

requirements

of

inquiry

based upon notice is a strictly factual determination.
Such a position over extends the caselaw and is inconsistent
with

logic or the procedure followed by the Trial Court.
There

a

is

significant

good

faith

no
role

question

that

factual

questions

in the determination of whether

purchaser.

Normally the jury

will

have

through the facts, and will make this determination
what

it decides happened.

instruction

one
to

6

final

is

a

wade

largely

But they must apply the facts to

of the Court on the law to reach a

play

on
the

decision.

Thus, petitioner's cases do nol : relegate the determination solely
to

fact,

niakluq

hut

characterize correctly the role of

the

in

il\s Idi.'l.iidl tine .. . hv applying the law as presented

by

the Court.
The
cited

case

by

of Be:.

Fredericks,
rt

petiti oner ,

one of fact to be I nvf*"*".igated
g: e3

o 1:1

-

the

implicitly
what

a

The

vendor

lrposes oi
-;

*h n Q . +- h e fourt

appl i ca ti on
and

:>f

facts

behavior.

star

The

guished

was

Trucking

of

< •-vasi:.

..* ,>.

Washington

^

Company,

286

*

i

Miebach

* *
«ootr friendly
E

good

:QH;

uuw id^i a

addressed

of

hnt|

- cut

is

aqai nst

i

of the idct, ... <^ ^.

ana 1 ysis

or

rebutting

Court nas clearly recognized that determination of

v, Colasurdo, 685 P.2d.

First

and

conduct

determination

Marcus

is

. . . J.<-I. au z.t9.

:c . I
,

factual y

purchaser

An

i ide „i <» i-vT-iry,

- .jnc^upon

.

standards

faith

therein

recognizing the distinction between determination

occurred

Supreme

.

onceal a prior grantee ? "nterest,

adequate

pres 1 J in111 1

^ev. 1979)

**

a

^ *

similar person witn : i~«>, does not constitute

examp i **

a par'-

states, "the question whether

C 01 11: I: t h € 11

- . :- <:

2d

5 83

y he
. . N.L.R.B.

(2

CA,

q iioti ng from Professor J affe , J 1 ldge Fr :i e n d I! \

v

.19 6

st>ii e s 1

finding of fact is the assertion that a phenomena has happened or
is

01; wi ] 3

be

happening independent of

7

or

anterior

tc any

1

assertion as to its legal effect,'"

Id., at 590

From this Judge

Friendly developed three major groupings of determinations.
The
terms

first involved those cases where the definition of

are not in dispute and it is necessary only to

the

apply

the

raw facts as they are determined to the well settled meanings.
The

second category involve those case disputes where

both

the raw facts and the meanings of the terms to which they are
be applied are in guestion.
And
issue,

third,

are

to

Id. at 590-591.

those cases where the

facts

are

not

in

but only the meanings of the terms to which they will

be

applied. Id. at 590-591.
The

first

decided

grouping is decided solely on fact.

solely

fact.

The

on law, and the second combining both

third

law

and

In the instant case all of the facts were read into

the

record by the parties and it became necessary only for the

Trial

Court to determine if these facts met the standards necessary for
a

finding

of

bona fide purchaser for

value,

or

that

proper

inguiry had been made.
Petitioner asserts the Trial Court viewed his

determination

as one of fact. To support this position they recite five of

the

Courts

and

"Findings

Conclusion
Decision
do
are

of

Facts"

from

the

Finding

of law which they prepared following

of
the

Memorandum

of the Court. (Petition for Certiorari, Page 11)

not mention, however, that each of these "Findings
also

Fact

listed

as Conclusion of Law,
8

numbers

They

of Fact"

11,6,1,2,

and

3,respectively.

Thus,

at

best,

the

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law they prepared recognized this determination as
a mixed determination of fact on law.
But

of even more significance is the language of the

Court

itself. In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Fredericks wrote:
"In
applying the foregoing
legal
principle
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court to the facts
and events of this case, the Court concludes that
neither Dakal nor Diversified was a bona fide
purchaser of the property." [Emphasis added. . .]
(Memorandum Decision, Page 6)
Even
fact.

the Trial Court did not view its role as a

finder

The Court accepted the facts as stipulated by the

of

parties

and made legal conclusions based thereon.
The
its

basis for review utilized by the Court of

Appeals

judgment thereon is correct and the petition should

and

not

be

granted.
III.
PLAINTIFFS MET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
GIVEN THE FACTS PRESENTED TO THEM.
Plaintiff
the

will not repeat its arguments on the

purpose

Court

of

INQUIRY
merits

of this review, but relys upon the opinion

Appeals

and the brief of Plaintiff to

the

for

of

the

Court

of

Appeals below.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff
the

opinion

contends that petitioner has failed to show
of

the

Court

of

Appeals

Q

conflicts

with

that
prior

decisions of this Court and that there is any departure from

the

usual course of judicial proceedings, let alone, such a departure
from

the

mainstream as to justify review by

this

Court.

The

petition should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of November, 1987.
IPONEY & ASSOCIATES

Ip&Ltr-r ^y

Jerome^H^ ""ftooney
Attorney fpr Plaintiffs/Appellants
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brief
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APPENDIX

Exhibit 1

- Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a)

Exhibit 2

-

Trial Court's Memorandum Decision

Exhibit 3

-

Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
Law

of

RULE 52. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 52, Findings by the Court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon,
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the
court.
It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need
not enter findings of fact and conclusions in rulings on motions,
except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however,
issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on
all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.

£/. 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, I N C , a
Utah corporation, and
DAKAL, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO. C-83-2042

:

vs.

:

MARK ENGAR LISTON, et al.,
Defendants,

:
:

I.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint of
plaintiffs Diversified Equities, Inc. and Dakal, Inc. (hereinafter "Diversified" and "Dakal", respectively) to quiet title
in plaintiffs to a duplex and lot (hereinafter "the property"),
more particularly described as Lot 41, Tamlee Village, located
at 7680 South 375 East, Salt Lake County, Utah.

In addition,

defendant American Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter
"American"), in plaintiffs' original action, has filed:

(1)

a Counterclaim against plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal, alleging
that plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers of the property
and have been unjustly enriched a)t American1 s expense? (2) a
Cross-claim against defendant Mark Engar Liston (hereinafter

£x. 2

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
VS. LISTON, ET AL

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

"Liston"), alleging that Liston is still liable to American
on the Note and Deed of Trust originally executed by Donald
J. and Karen Bailey, which Liston assumed when he purchased
the property from the Baileys; and (3) a Third-Party Complaint
against Third Party defendant Douglas F. Rydalch (hereinafter
"Rydalch"), alleging that Rydalch has been unjustly enriched
at American's expense.
II.

FACTS

The above-mentioned claims of the parties have arisen
from an extremely complex and lengthy scenario of facts and
events dating back to 1978.

The Court has carefully reviewed

the Transcript of Stipulation of Facts of April 19, 1984, agreed
to by all the parties, and has examined all of the documentary
evidence received, and considered the testimony of the witnesses.
The Court concludes that any attempt to set forth the facts
and events leading up to and necessary for the disposition of
the claims of the parties would be in most part a reiteration
of the Stipulation of Facts, and the parties should therefore
refer to such Stipulation when necessary.

In the following

Conclusions of the Court, reference will be made, where
appropriate, to the particular Exhibits and pages of the Transcript of Stipulation relied upon by the Court.

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
VS. LISTON, ET AL

PAGE THREE
III.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

CONCLUSIONS

The parties should bear in mind that a court of equity
may exercise broad discretion in framing its decrees in order
to adopt the relief granted to the circumstances of a particular
case, and such relief should be adjusted in a manner which is
just and equitable and affords protection to and finally
determines the rights and claims of all parties.

An equity

court is not bound by strict or rigid legal remedies or by the
particular pleadings setting forth the specific claims for relief
of the parties.

See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. Equity § 599, et seq.;

27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 102, et seq.
As stated succinctly by the Utah Supreme Court in Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485 (Utah 1975), "A court
of equity can and should regard as done that which ought to
be done; and similarly, it can and should regard as not having
been done that which ought not to have been done.H

These state-

ments are consistent with Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P., which states
in pertinent part that "every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings."
The Court has reviewed the legal Memoranda submitted by
the parties and conducted its own research into the numerous

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
VS. LISTON, ET AL

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

legal questions presented and, with the foregoing statements
regarding its equitable powers in mind, makes the following
Conclusions concerning the rights and liabilities of all the
parties:
A.

NEITHER DAKAL NOR DIVERSIFIED WAS A
BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE PROPERTY

The key issue as to whether Dakal and/or Diversified
should be accorded the status of a bona fide purchaser and thus
be entitled to prevail over American's claims against the
property is whether Dakal and Diversified had "actual notice"
of American's security interest in the property which was
mistakenly released by American prior to the conveyance of the
property from Rydalch to Dakal and Dakal to Diversified.

It

is readily apparent from Utah case law and the general weight
of authority that "actual notice", as used in conjunction with
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 and § 57-3-3 (1953 as amended) has been
interpreted to include implied or constructive notice.

The

Utah Supreme Court has expounded upon this interpretation of
"actual notice" in a long line of cases dating back prior to
statehood.

Reiterating the holding of the seminal case before

the Court in 1890, in its very recent decision of Johnson vs.
Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983), the Court defined "actual
notice" as follows:
This statute was under examination by
this Court in Toland vs. Corey, 6 Utah
392, 24 P. 190 (1890) where we held
that the "actual notice" required by
§ 57-1-6 was satisfied if a party

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
Vfr. LISTOtt, ST AL

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

dealing with the land had information
of facts which would put a prudent man
upon inquiry and which, if pursued,
would lead to actual knowledge as to
the state of the title. See a similar
expression in McGarry vs. Thompson,
114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948)
[Emphasis added]
The Utah Supreme Court has further expounded upon the
nature of the "inquiry" required of a "prudent" man in order
to be a bona fide purchaser.

In McGarry vs. Thompson, 114 Utah

442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948), cited by the court in Johnson vs.
Bell, supra, the court made the following statement:
[W]hatever is notice enough to excite
attention and put the party on his guard
and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have
led. When a person has sufficient
information to lead him to a fact, he
shall be deemed conversant of it.
[Emphasis added] 201 P.2d at 293.
Additionally, in Pender vs. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283,
265 P.2d 644, 649 (1954), the court held as follows:
Moreover, the inquiry must be made at a
reliable source from which the true
state of facts will be naturally
disclosed, it is not sufficient that
the purchaser make an inquiry of a
person when he knows that it is to
such person's interest to misrepresent
or conceal the existence of the outstanding interests and that such
person does deny its existence.

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
VS. LISTON, ET AL

PAGE SIX

MEMORANDUM DECISION

In applying the foregoing legal principles enunciated
by the Utah Supreme Court to the facts and events of this case,
the Court concludes that neither Dakal nor Diversified was a
bona fide purchaser of the property.

The Court is in substantial

agreement with the arguments of American set forth on pages
8-10 of its Memorandum of April 25, 1984.
Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal
and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer
of Dakal and Diversified, in arranging the sale of the property
from Rydalch to Dakal (Tr. pp. 16-23).

The Court also concludes

that Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding the
conveyances of the property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal
to Diversified are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal
and Diversified (Tr. pp. 18-22; Plaintiffs1 Exs. 5 & 6;
Defendants' Exs. 4 2 & 43; Norman vs. Murray First Thrift & Loan
Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979), and cases cited therein).
Consequently, in determining whether Dakal or Diversified
should be accorded bona fide purchaser status, the "actual
notice" (as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson,
McGarry, and Pender, supra) of both Pentelute and Peck are
imputed to both Dakal and Diversified in regard to American's Trust
Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by American.
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The Court concludes that Pentelute and/or Peck had more
than sufficient information to necessitate a further inquiry
into whether Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation
to American and whether American had made a mistake in releasing
its Trust Deed on the property-

Such an inquiry would have

in all probability led to the discovery that neither the
Rydalches nor anyone else had paid American and that American's
release of its Trust Deed was in fact a mistake.

Both Pentelute

and Peck had substantial experience and dealings with distressed
properties and real estate transactions in general, both were
aware of the approximate market value of the property, and
Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the property at
the time the Rydalches acquired the property from M & W Enterprises
through Roy Miller (Tr. pp. 16-19; Defendants1 Exs. 35, 36,
38, 40).
In addition, the Court finds that other facts and events
support its conclusion that Pentelute and/or Peck knew or should
have known that something was amiss regarding the Rydalches'
representation of their fee simple ownership of the property.
Such facts and events include the "distress" sale of the property
by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less
of its market value (Tr. pp. 11-12, 15, 19), the $14,000.00
finders fee paid to Pentelute by Peck compared to the purchase
price by Dakal of $37,980.00 (Tr. pp. 19-21), and the same-day
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transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified by Peck for
$60,000.00 (Tr. pp. 20-21;

Plaintiffs' Exs. 2, 6 ) .

Therefore, the Court concludes that all of the abovementioned evidence, particularly when viewed as a whole, clearly
establishes that Dakal and Diversified were not bona fide purchasers
of the property under Utah statutory and case law.
B.

THE RYDALCHES HAVE "UNCLEAN HANDS" AND ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO FAVORABLE EQUITABLE RELIEF

Perhaps the most important and time-honored maxim of equity
is that one who comes before a court of equity with "unclean
hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treatment.
Upon examining all of the evidence, this Court concludes that
the Rydalches do have "unclean hands" by reason of their representations of fee simple ownership of the property with no security
interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the property
without the written or oral approval of American.
The warranty deed conveying the property from M & W Enterprises
to the Rydalches expressly stated that the property was subject
to American's Trust Deed (Defendants' Ex. 38). The Buyer's
Escrow Instructions, executed by the Rydalches, also expressly
stated that the property was subject to American's Trust Deed
and also subject to the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement
requiring the written approval of American prior to any sale
or transfer of the property (Defendants' Ex. 35). The Rydalches
also executed an Indemnification and Waiver agreement for
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Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged that Stewart
Title Co., the escrow and closing agent, had informed them of
the existence of Americanfs Non-Assumption Agreement, and that
the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify Stewart Title
Co, for any consequences resulting from the failure to obtain
written approval from American prior to the transfer of the
property (Defendants1 Ex. 37). M & W also executed a Transfer
and Assignment of Reserve Account, which assigned and transferred
to the Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of
taxes and insurance on the property (Defendants' Ex. 36). Based
upon an appraisal of

the property by Academy Appraisal Associates

(Defendants' Ex. 39), the Rydalches received a Title Insurance
Policy from Stewart Title Co. in the amount of $103,000.00
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy itself
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed
of Trust and Non-Assumption agreement (Defendants' Ex. 40).
The closing officer at Stewart Title Co. further indicated that
she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that the property
was subject to American's Deed of Trust.
Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American
had not been paid, since they had not done so, and that American's
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake.
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The Court therefore concludes that the Rydalches have
"unclean hands" and are not entitled to favorable equitable
relief.

It is most unfortunate and the Court empathizes with

the Rydalches that they have been the victims of an apparent
fraud perpetrated by Roy Miller through M & W Enterprises.
However, such action by Miller offers no legal or equitable
justification for the actions of the Rydalches regarding their
representations that American's interest in the property had
been satisfied and their sale of the property to Dakal.
C.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT -- THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
OF ALL THE PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT

As the Court has concluded that Dakal and Diversified
were not bona fide purchasers of the property, and in conjunction
with the overall equitable remedy decided by the Court, infra,
it is the judgment of the Court that all transactions regarding
the transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified are
rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Diversified
to the property or Dakal, respectively, are terminated.
Title to the property is quieted in Dakal, subject to
an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of unpaid
principal and arrearages due

and owing and upon precisely the

same payment terms of principal and interest as American's original
Trust Deed and all other terms of said Trust Deed, with the
specific exception that the sole obligor or trustor of Americcin's
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Dakal shall have six months

to bring current all arrearages for monthly payments and any
arrearages for the reserve account to pay taxes and insurance
on the property as of the date of this Memorandum Decision.
All principal, interest and reserve account payments from such
date shall be the sole obligation of Dakal.

All rental payments

from tenants paid in escrow or due shall go to Dakal.
The Rydalches have been unjustly enriched at the expense
of Dakal in the amount of $37,980.00, the sale price of the
property.

The closing costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches

to Dakal shall remain as paid by Dakal.

The $14,000.00 finders

fee paid to Pentelute by Dakal or Peck was not part of the
sale price and any cause of action between Dakal or Peck and
Pentelute is up to those parties, as Pentelute is not a party
to these proceedings.

A Judgment by the Court is therefore

rendered against the Rydalches and in favor of Dakal for $37,980.00.
All rights and/or liabilities of the Rydalches relating to the
property are terminated.
In the opinion of the Court, Liston is the least culpable
of all the parties now before the Court.

His only liability

could arise from his transfer of the property without obtaining
the prior approval of American.

Without ruling on the legal

question of whether Liston may still be liable pursuant to the
terms of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, the Court concludes

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
VS. LISTON, ET AL

PAGE TWELVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

that it would be inequitable for Liston to remain personally
liable in view of the Court's remedy as set forth above.

Therefore,

all rights and/or liabilities of Liston relating to the property
or American's claims against Liston are terminated.
The Court also empathizes with Liston and it is most
unfortunate that he is the apparent victim of a fraud perpetrated
by Roy Miller and/or M & W Enterprises, Herb Holtzer and Shino
Corporation.

However, none of these parties is now before the

Court and Liston must pursue his own cause of action against
any of them.
All of the parties now before the Court bear some responsibility
for the events leading up to these proceedings.

Although only

mentioned briefly by the Court, the unfortunate result of the
entire chain of events would not have occurred except for the
negligent and unilateral mistake of American in releasing its
interest in the property.

It is therefore the judgment of the

Court that each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's
fees and that American is not entitled to any late fees which
have accrued as of the date of this Memorandum Decision.
Counsel for American shall prepare the necessary Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order of the Court,
including the precise amounts of all sums due and owing from
one party to another as of the date of this Memorandum Decision,
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and in accordance therewith.

Such documents shall be submitted

to the Court and other parties by ,-[nno ?n
Dated this

JjO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

day of May, 1984

IQP,4
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah
corporation, and DAKAL, I N C , a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs,
MARK ENGAR LISTON; ROY L. MILLER
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband
and wife; BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and
wife; each idividually; and
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee
and not individually; and AMERICAN
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah
banking corporation; BEEHIVE THRIFT
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah banking corporation; and M & W ENTERPRISES, allegedly a Utah general
partnership; and JOHN DOE NUMBERS 1
through 10 being all other persons
unknown, claiming any right, title,
estate or interest in, or lien upon
the real property described in the
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs'
ownership, or clouding their title
thereto,
Defendants.
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION,
PRATT.
CAHOON
e AT L A W
\N OAVtMaS '
ZA
!
ON&«@UTM t
I t CITY,
»«!0«

Third-party
Plaintiff,

Case No. C83-2042
Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, Judge

I

i

i
i

i

i
!
vs.
J STEWART TITLE COMPANY and DOUGLAS
F. RYDALCH,
!
i

Third-party
Defendants.

THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
J J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th
J day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been pre' viously dismissed therefrom, and the remaining

following

parties

being present and/or represented by their respective counsel:

For

the Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar
Liston, David J.

Knowlton, Esq.; for Defendant

and Third-party

•Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams
III, Esq.; for Third-party Defendant Douglas R. Rydalch, Duane A.
Burnett, Esq.
The parties represented

at the hearing having

entered

into

and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all the
parties so represented, and said parties having introduced their
respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defendant Mark Engar Liston having presented evidence, and the Court
having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary,
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the premises, makes the following:

I
I

PIHDINGS OF FACT
1.
Plaintiff

On or about January 27, 1978, Defendant and Third-party
American

Savings

and

Loan

Association

(hereinafter

"American") made a loan to Donald J. and Karen H. Bailey in the
sum of $59,200, which loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note and
a Deed of Trust.

The Deed of Trust was dated January 27, 1978,

and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page 826
of Book 4619 in the official

records of

the Salt

Lake

County

Recorder's Office.
2.

The real property (hereinafter "property") described in

said Deed of Trust is located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and is
more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, according to the official
plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.
»
:

3.

In

October,

1980, the

Defendant Mark Engar Liston

Baileys

sold

the

(sometimes hereinafter

property

to

"Liston") who

assumed the Baileys1 loan with American upon American's approval
by executing a Mortgage Loan Assumption Agreement, a Modification
Agreement, and a Waiver of Deed of Trust Non-Assumption

Agree-

ment.
4.

In the documentation signed by Liston when he assumed

the above-described loan, the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement was waived specifically

and exclusively

for the conveyance

from Bailey to Liston, but the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement did remain in effect as to subsequent sales«

5.

On May 14f 1982, Liston gave to K & W Enterprises a War-

ranty Deed (which was subsequently recorded) without the approval
or knowledge of American, even though the property was still subject to American's Trust Deed,
6.

On May 28 r 1982, without American's knowledge or appro-

val, M & W Enterprises sold the property to Defendant Douglas F.
Rydalch

(sometimes

hereinafter

"Rydalch")

and

his

wife,

Joan

Rydalch (hereinafter referred to with Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch
as "Rydalches").
7#

The

Warranty

Deed

conveying

the

property

from

M & W

Enterprises to the Rydalches, expressly stated that the property
was subject to American's Trust Deed.
8.

The

Buyer's

Escrow

Instructions,

executed

by

the

Rydalches, also expressly stated that the property was subject to
American's

Trust

Deed

and

also

subject

to

the

Deed

of

Trust

Non-Assumption Agreement requiring the written approval of American prior to any sale or transfer of the property.
9.

The Rydalches also executed an Indemnification and Wai-

ver Agreement for Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged
that

Stewart

Title

Company,

the

escrow

and

closing

agent, had

informed them of the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, and that

the Rydalches would

Stewart

Title

Company

failure

to obtain

for

written

transfer of the property.
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any

hold

harmless

consequences

approval

from

and

resulting

American

indemnify
from

prior

the

to the

10.

M & W Enterprises also executed a Transfer and Assign-

ment of Reserve Account

which

assigned

and

transferred

to the

Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of taxes and
insurance on the property.
11.

Based

upon

an

appraisal

Appraisal Associates, the
policy

from

Stewart

Title

of

Rydalches
Company

the

property

received
in

the

by

a title

amount

of

Academy

insurance
$103,000.

Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy, itself,
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed of
Trust and Non-Assumption Agreement.
12.

The

closing

officer

at

Stewart

Title

Company

further

indicated that she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that
the property was subject to American's Deed of Trust.
13.
Deed

on

American mistakenly and unilaterally released its Trust
the

property

by

reconveyance

which

was

recorded

on

December 9, 1982, as Entry No. 3737849 in Book 5424, page 1731 in
I the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.
!

14.

The Trust Deed in favor of American had in fact not been

•

1

paid and the reconveyance was erroneously given.

Said Trust Deed

»

i continues to be unpaid.

i
}

15.

As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal

1

balance owed

to American

under

its Trust

Deed

is

$56,742.92 and the arrearages under said Trust Deed

the

sum of

(which total

$15,886.00) consist of principal in the sura of $1,283.60, interest
in
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the

sun

of

$12,626.12

and

$1,956.28.

-5-

reserve

account

in

the

sum

of

16-

On February 17, 1983, American recorded its Affidavit as

Entry No, 3760970 in Book 5439 at page 171 in the official records
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, indicating that
the Trust Deed, described hereinabove, had been released by mistake,
17.

Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew

or certainly should have known that their obligation to American
had not been paid since they had not done so and that American's
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake.
18.

On

Rydalches

January

sold

the

21,

1983,

subject

(sometimes hereinafter

for

the

property

to

sum

of

$37,980,

the

Dakal,

Inc.

Plaintiff

"Dakal") which on the same day, sold the

property to Plaintiff Diversified Equities, Inc. (sometimes hereinafter

"Diversified" or "Diversified

Equities") for

the sum of

$60,000.
19.

Prior to the sale of the property

to Dakal if Defendant

Rydalch represented to Dakal that American's interest

in the pro-

i perty had been satisfied.
j

20.

i Rydalches

At

the

time

of

the

sale

of

the

property

to Dakal, Wayne Peck was the President

from

the

and

principal

Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events

regarding

executive officer of Dakal and Diversified.
21.

: the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch
i

to Dakal, Inc.,

and

from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified

Equities,

Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diver)C. PKATT.
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27.

Both

Brad

Pentelute

and

Wayne

Peck

had

substantial

j experience and dealings with distressed properties and real estate
• transactions in general, both were aware of the approximate market
value of the property and Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the property at the time the Rydalches

acquired

the pro-

perty from M & W Enterprises (Pentelute had received a copy of the
title insurance policy for the property received by the Rydalches
at the time of their purchase which showed American's lien).
28.

The property

was

sold

by

the

Rydalches

to Dakal

for

approximately one-half or less of its market value.
»

29.

Wayne Peck paid a finder's fee in the sum of $14,000 to

Brad Pentelute for arranging the property's purchase by Dakal.
—

30.

Dakal paid the closing costs of the conveyance from the

Rydalches to Dakal.
31.

Dakal is entitled to receive all rental payments in the

total sum of $325.00 from tenants of the property which have been
j paid in escrow or are currently due.
|

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

i

1.

Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had more than suffi-

i

1

cient

information to necessitate a further

Rydalch had actually "satisfied"

inquiry

the obligation

into whether

to American

and

whether American had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on
the property.
2.

Such an inquiry would have, in all probability, lead to

the discovery that while the Rydalches, and no one else, had the
iobligation to pay American's loan, neither the Rydalches nor anyc. P R A T T .
ft C A H O O N
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one

else had

paid American

and

Trust Deed was in fact a mistake.

that

American's

release

of

its

;

3.

In addition,

the Court

concludes

that

Brad

and/or Wayne Peck knew or should have known that

Pentelute

something was

amiss regarding the Rydalches representation of their fee simple
ownership of the property.

Supporting

facts

include

the •dis-

tress" sale of the property by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less of its market value, the $14,000 finder's
fee paid to Brad Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase
price

by Dakal

of $37,980,

and the same-day

transfer

of the

property from Dakal to Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000.
4.

Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck had "actual

notice" of

American's security interest in the property which was mistakenly
released by American prior to the conveyance of the property from
Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified.
5.

Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal

'. and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer of
; Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property
| from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc.
6.

Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events

regarding

J the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch
to Dakal, Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified

Equities,

Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diversified Equities.
7.

The actual notice of both Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck

are imputed to both Dakal and Diversified Equities
American's Trust Deed which was mistakenly
can.
*LYOE. PHATT.
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in regard to

reconveyed

by Ameri-

I

8.

Therefore, Dakal

and Diversified

Equities

had

"actual

notice" of American's security interest in the property which was
* mistakenly

released

by American

prior to the conveyance

of the

property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified Equities.
i

9.

Neither of the Plaintiffs, Diversified

Equities, Inc.,

nor Dakal, Inc., was a bona fide purchaser of the property.
10.

Thus, neither of the Plaintiffs, Diversified Equities,

Inc., nor Dakal, Inc. should

be entitled

to prevail over Ameri-

can's claims against the property.
11.

The Rydalches either knew or certainly should have known

| that their obligation to American

had not been paid, since they

: had not done so and that American's release of its trust deed on
i the property had to be a mistake.
I

12.

The Rydalches have "unclean hands" by reason of their

i

j representations of fee simple ownership of the property with no
security interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the
property without the written or oral approval of American.
13.

Because

one who comes

before

a court

of

equity

with

"unclean hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treatment , the

Rydalches

are

not

entitled

to

favorable„

equitable

. relief,
14.
from

Dakal

and/or
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15.

Pursuant

to its original trust deed dated January 27f

1978, and recorded February 2 r 1978f as Entry No. 3059974 at page
826 in Book 4619 of the official records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder in Salt Lake County, Utah, American

is entitled

to an

equitable lien upon the property for the amount of unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely the same payment terms as American's original trust deed (as set forth in this
paragraph) and all other terms of said trust deed with the specific

exception

that

the sole

obligor

or trustor

of American's

security interest should be Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc.
16.

Title to the property should be quieted

in Dakal, sub-

ject to an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of
unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely
the same payment

terms of principal and interest

original trust deed

as American's

(dated January 27, 1978 and recorded

in the

office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on February 2, 1978,

as

Entry No. 3059974 at page 826 in Book 4619) and all other terms of
said trust deed, with the specific exception that the sole obligor
or trustor of American's security interest should be Dakal.
17.

As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal

balance owed to American under its equitable lien is the sum of
$56,742*92 and the arrearages

under said

total $15,886.00) consist of principal

equitable

lien

(which

in the sum of $1,283.60,

interest in the sum of $12#626.12 and reserve account in the sum
of $1,956,28.
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Assumption Agreement, it would be inequitable for Defendant Liston
to remain personally liable to American.
28.

All rights and/or liabilities of Defendant Liston relat-

ing to the property or American's claim against Liston should be
terminated.
29.

All rights and/or liabilites of Defendant Liston relat-

ing to the property or American's claim against Liston should be
terminated.
30.

The Court concludes that because all of the parties now

before the Court bear some responsibilities for the events leading
up to these proceedings and because the result of the entire chain
of events would

not have occurred except for the negligent and

unilateral mistake of American in releasing

its interest

in the

property, each party should bear its own costs and attorneys fees.
Also American is not entitled to any late fees which have accrued
as of May 30, 1984.
DATED this

day of July, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

J. Dennis Frederick
District Court Judge
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